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ABSTRACT    
In  2009,  Congress  passed  the  American  Recovery  and  Reinvestment  Act    
(ARRA).  This  legislation  provided  an  increase  in  Supplemental  Food  Assistance  
Program  (SNAP)  payouts  of  15%,  on  average.  Employing  the  Linear  Probability,  
Logit  and  Ordered  Logit  Difference-­‐‑in-­‐‑Difference  models,  I  estimate  the  impact  
of  this  payout  increase  on  reported  hunger.  I  use  data  from  the  Food  Security  
Supplement  of  the  Current  Population  Survey.    The  results  show  that  increases  
in  SNAP  payouts  have  reduced  the  probability  of  being  hungry  at  all  in  the  
previous  month.  Furthermore,  when  estimating  the  impact  on  the  frequency  of  
hunger,  I  find  that  those  who  are  likely  to  report  being  hungry  more  often  
experience  larger  reductions  in  their  probability  of  being  hungry  due  to  increases  
in  SNAP  payouts.  These  findings  support  the  effectiveness  of  increased  SNAP  
payouts  during  harsh  economic  times  and  further  help  identify  the  level  of  
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1.  Introduction  
In  the  years  2007-­‐‑2009,  the  United  States  experienced  what  is  commonly  referred  
to  as  the  Great  Recession.  This  recession  has  had  many  negative  effects  on  the  
socio-­‐‑economic  climate  in  America  and  the  world,  such  as  rising  unemployment  
rates,  increases  in  job  losses  and  slow  growth  of  new  businesses  (Bureau  of  Labor  
Statistics,  2012).  Such  a  turn  of  events  prompted  the  US  government  to  pass  the  
American  Recovery  and  Reinvestment  Act  of  2009.  This  act  allocated  funds  to  
numerous  projects,  which  not  only  included  infrastructure  projects  at  the  state  
level,  but  also  a  temporary  increase  in  SNAP  payouts  to  recipients.  This  
amounted  to  an  average  increase  of  15%  in  SNAP  payouts  (United  States  
Department  of  Agriculture,  2012).  
  
Since  SNAP’s  primary  goal  is  to  provide  additional  support  for  families  who  
have  difficulty  securing  food,  increasing  SNAP  payouts  during  a  recession  is  
meant  to  smooth  out  their  consumption  of  food.    It  is  thus  necessary  to  
understand  whether  this  attempted  consumption  smoothing  has  affected  the  
reported  hunger  of  participants.  The  motivation  behind  this  paper  is  based  on  
understanding  whether  the  high  financial  investment  by  the  federal  government  
has  in  fact  helped  poor  families  reduce  their  potential  hunger  in  times  of  harsh  
economic  climate.    
SNAP	  Payouts	   4	  
This  paper  bears  some  similarities  to  Nord  and  Prell  (2011)  who  looked  at  the  
impact  of  increased  SNAP  payouts  on  food  security  using  Difference-­‐‑in-­‐‑
Difference,  among  other  methods,  for  the  period  2008-­‐‑2009.  Though  I  employ  the  
same  dataset  and  Difference-­‐‑in-­‐‑Difference  as  well,  I  look  at  the  impact  of  
increased  SNAP  payouts  on  how  frequently  respondents  report  being  hungry,  a  
different  food  security  indicator.  I  also  employ  data  for  years  2007  to  2010,  which  
is  a  longer  period  than  their  data.  The  purpose  of  my  paper  is  to  investigate  
whether  SNAP  payout  increases  caused  households  to  report  less  hunger  in  
general,  and  to  identify  what  effects  this  expansion  had  on  the  frequency  of  
hunger.  
  
I  find  that  increased  SNAP  payouts  have  in  fact  reduced  the  probability  of  being  
hungry  by  14%,  on  average  and  holding  all  else  constant.  This  result  is  robust  to  
the  addition  of  other  covariates  and  to  sensitivity  analysis.  I  also  find  that  the  
probability  of  being  hungry  is  reduced  in  greater  magnitude  for  those  who  
report  being  hungry  more  often.  Those  who  reported  being  hungry  21-­‐‑30  days  
experience  a  decrease  of  35%  in  their  probability  to  be  hungry  in  that  range  again  
after  SNAP  increases.    
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The  rest  of  this  paper  proceeds  as  follows:    Section  2  gives  some  background  
information  on  SNAP  participation  during  the  great  recession  and  reviews  
relevant  recent  literature.  Section  3  explains  the  methods  I  employ  including  my  
model  specification.  Background  information  on  the  data  used  along  with  
important  notes  regarding  data  manipulation  is  included  in  Section  4.  Section  5  
shows  results  and  sensitivity  analysis  and  Section  6  concludes  with  a  discussion  
of  my  findings.    
  
2.  Background  and  Literature  Review  
2.1  Background  on  SNAP  eligibility,  participation  and  impact  
According  to  the  Congressional  Budget  Office  (2012),  85%  of  households  that  
were  SNAP  participants  in  2010  were  below  the  Federal  Poverty  Line  (FPL).  This  
follows  from  the  fact  that  SNAP  eligibility  is  largely  dependent  on  household  
income.  However,  it  is  also  dependent  on  the  number  of  people  in  the  
household,  among  other  factors.  I  employ  those  two  factors  as  the  main  
determinants  of  eligibility  as  they  are  good  indicators  for  eligibility  in  SNAP.  
Households  can  also  be  deemed  to  be  eligible  or  ineligible  based  on  their  
participation  in  other  social  programs  but  are  usually  eligible  due  to  the  income  
threshold  relative  to  the  Federal  Poverty  Level  Guidelines.  About  72%  of  
households  eligible  for  SNAP  participated  in  the  program  in  2009,  with  the  
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likelihood  of  participating  rising  as  household  income  went  down.  This  implies  
that  there  are  households  eligible  for  SNAP  that  do  not  participate  in  the  
program  (Congretional  Budget  Office,  2012).    
  
SNAP  participation  usually  increases  in  times  of  high  unemployment  
(Congretional  Budget  Office,  2012).  This  implies  that  for  a  relatively  high  
unemployment  period  such  as  the  Great  Recession  (Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  
2012),  there  is  a  rise  in  SNAP  participation.    
  
2.2  Relevant  Studies  
The  literature  on  SNAP  is  varied  both  in  terms  of  the  results  and  methods.  
Researchers  have  tried  to  evaluate  SNAP’s  impact  on  food  insecurity,  food  
expenditure  and  how  participants  compare  with  non-­‐‑participants  in  terms  of  
food  sufficiency.    
  
Beatty  and  Tuttle  (2012)  find  that  as  SNAP  payouts  increase,  there  is  an  increase  
in  the  share  of  household  expenditures  spent  on  food-­‐‑at-­‐‑home.  This  supports  the  
consumption  smoothing  goal  of  increased  SNAP  payouts.  Participating  
households  are  also  seen  to  experience  less  food  insecurity  (Golla  and  Nord  2009,  
McKernan  et  al.  2011).  Nord  and  Prell  (2011)  observe  a  similar  trend  during  the  
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ARRA  period.  They  find  that  increasing  SNAP  payouts  reduces  food  insecurity  
by  2.2  percentage  points.  These  studies  point  to  SNAP  participation  effectively  
reducing  food  insecurity  and  stabilizing  food  consumption  in  times  of  recession.  
To  supplement  the  literature,  in  this  paper,  I  further  estimate  the  impact  of  SNAP  
on  the  frequency  of  reported  hunger.    
  
3.  Methods  
One  of  the  fundamental  issues  with  statistical  evaluations  of  social  phenomena  is  
that,  unlike  physical  sciences,  social  experiments  are  not  always  practically,  
financially,  or  ethically  feasible.  For  this  reason,  econometricians  have  developed  
numerous  methods  to  go  beyond  the  use  of  experimental  methods.  For  this  
paper,  I  use  Difference-­‐‑in-­‐‑Differences  (DID)  to  measure  the  treatment  impact.  
The  passage  of  the  ARRA  acts  as  an  exogenous  policy  shock,  allowing  SNAP  to  
be  evaluated  as  a  natural  experiment  using  DID.  The  treatment  impact  in  this  
case  is  the  Average  Treatment  Effect  on  the  Treated  (ATET).  
  
3.1  Treatment  and  Comparison  Groups  
One  of  the  fundamental  issues  with  non-­‐‑experimental  methods  of  evaluation  
arises  from  self-­‐‑selection.  If  program  participants  are  allowed  to  self-­‐‑select  into  
the  program  (as  is  true  with  SNAP)  they  could  be  systematically  different  from  
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those  who  do  not  self-­‐‑select  into  the  program.  DID  attempts  to  fix  this  issue  by  
comparing  the  trends  for  the  treatment  group  to  those  in  the  comparison  group,  
before  and  after  the  treatment  has  occurred.  For  this  method  to  work,  it  is  
important  that  the  difference  in  trends  between  the  groups  is  only  due  to  the  
treatment.  It  is  impossible  to  test  this  assumption.  However,  I  select  my  
treatment  and  comparison  groups  to  minimize  the  potential  differences  in  trends  
that  take  occur  due  to  reasons  other  than  the  treatment.    
  
Using  traditional  designs  of  DID,  the  treatment  group  should  be  SNAP  
participants  while  the  comparison  group  should  be  people  who  qualify  for  
SNAP  but  are  not  SNAP  participants.  However,  this  approach  would  prove  
problematic  in  this  case.  The  people  who  are  eligible  for  SNAP  but  do  not  
participate  are  likely  to  have  systematic  differences  compared  to  SNAP  
participants,  making  them  an  unsuitable  comparison  group.  I  thus  employ  an  
approach  similar  to  Nord  and  Prell  (2011)  in  defining  my  treatment  and  
comparison  groups.  I  identify  those  households  that  are  eligible  (less  or  equal  to  
130%  of  Federal  Poverty  Line)  and  participate  in  SNAP  as  my  treatment  group.  
My  comparison  group  is  then  made  up  of  those  households  that  are  barely  
eligible  (150-­‐‑250%  of  Federal  Poverty  Line)  and  do  not  participate  in  SNAP.  The  
households  in  the  130-­‐‑150%  range  of  Federal  Poverty  Line  are  not  used  as  their  
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eligibility  is  not  easily  inferred.    This  assumes  that  these  two  groups,  being  close  




I  need  to  make  several  assumptions  to  construct  my  treatment  and  comparison  
groups.  First,  I  assume  that  those  who  are  barely  ineligible  would  enroll  in  SNAP  
were  they  eligible.  Though  untestable,  this  assumption  relies  on  the  potential  
that  those  in  the  comparison  groups  are  rational  actors.  These  households  have  
limited  resources,  which  restrict  their  consumption  of  a  necessity  (food).  If  given  
the  opportunity,  they  would  participate  in  order  to  increase  their  consumption  of  
food,  which  is  a  basic  necessity  they  have  limited  access  to.    
  
Further,  I  assume  that  people  are  not  intentionally  reducing  their  income  in  order  
to  be  SNAP  eligible.  This  would  produce  an  unnatural  treatment  group.  Since  
income  is  a  major  determinant  of  selection  into  the  treatment  group,  it  is  hard  to  
imagine  that  households  would  purposefully  restrict  their  income,  as  they  are  
already  not  earning  much.    
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Additionally,  I  assume  that  the  treatment  and  comparison  groups  are  subject  to  
the  same  unobservable  trends  because  they  are  close  to  each  other  on  the  
eligibility  discontinuity.    Since  these  two  groups  are  not  far  from  each  other  in  
terms  of  socio-­‐‑economic  pressures,  they  are  very  likely  to  be  subject  to  the  same  
trends.  
  
3.3  Model    𝑌 = 𝑋!"𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 + 𝛽!𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇 + 𝛽!𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇 + 𝛽!𝐼[!!!] + 𝜖  
The  model  above  looks  at  the  impact  of  SNAP  payout  increases  (given  by  𝛽!)  on  
the  frequency  (days)  the  respondent  reported  being  hungry  due  to  not  being  able  
to  afford  enough  food  to  eat  in  the  past  month.  An  alternate  model  will  look  at  
the  impact  of  SNAP  increases  on  being  hungry  at  all.  The  two  other  variables  in  
the  model,  given  by  𝛽!  and  𝛽!,  are  dummy  variables  indicating  being  in  the  post  
treatment  period  and  being  in  the  treatment  group,  respectively.  Covariates  (𝑋!")  
employed  are  %  of  Federal  Poverty  Line,  number  of  children,  family  size,  
employment  status  and  race  (6  categories,  base:  white).  Though  the  data  does  not  
follow  a  panel  structure,  dummy  variables  for  state  and  year  attempt  to  make  the  
time  invariant  portion  of  the  error  term  the  same  across  units  of  observation  in  
each  state.    
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My  hypothesis  is  that  the  treatment  impact  will  have  a  negative  relationship  to  
both  versions  of  the  variable  of  interest.  I  anticipate  that  increasing  SNAP  
payouts  has  both  reduced  the  probability  of  being  hungry  at  all,  and  the  
probability  of  being  hungry  in  all  frequency  categories  discussed  in  Section  4.  
  
4.  Data  
I  use  data  from  the  Current  Population  Survey  Food  Security  Supplement  (CPS-­‐‑
FSS).  This  dataset  is  suitable  for  this  paper  due  to  its  richness  and  the  availability  
of  information  on  households  that  participate  in  SNAP,  their  reported  hunger,  as  
well  as  baseline  characteristics.  
  
4.1  Background  on  CPS-­‐‑FSS  
The  CPS-­‐‑FSS  is  a  supplement  to  the  Current  Population  Survey  administered  in  
December  of  each  year.  It  is  a  household-­‐‑level  questionnaire  that  inquires  about  
the  food  security  of  respondents.  The  Food  and  Nutrition  Service  of  the  USDA  
uses  an  18  item  scale  to  assess  food  security  based  on  the  results  of  the  CPS-­‐‑FSS.  
Households  that  are  eligible  for  the  CPS-­‐‑FSS  are  the  same  households  that  are  
eligible  for  the  regular  CPS.  Respondents  are  identified  based  on  where  they  
stand  relative  to  the  Federal  Poverty  Guidelines  and  whether  they  are  identified  
as  potentially  being  “food  insecure”  (Data.gov,  2014).  
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An  issue  encountered  as  a  result  of  using  CPS-­‐‑FSS  data  is  the  determination  of  
household  income.  The  CPS-­‐‑FSS  reports  household  income  in  ranges.  Therefore,  
the  identification  of  specific  household  income  becomes  problematic.  I  thus  
employ  a  technique  similar  to  Prell  and  Nord  (2011).  I  assign  the  nominal  median  
income  of  each  range  to  the  corresponding  households  in  the  bracket.  This  
method  is  appropriate  for  low-­‐‑income  households  (which  are  the  ones  that  make  
up  my  sample)  as  the  range  of  each  yearly  income  bracket  is  around  $2500,  
which  is  rather  small.  The  income  assigned  to  the  household  is  then  a  proxy  for  
the  actual  household  income.    
  
4.2  Ordered  Logit,  Logit  and  Linear  Probability  Model  
The  variable  of  interest  from  the  data  identifies  how  often  in  the  past  30  days  the  
respondents  went  hungry  because  they  could  not  afford  more  food.  The  
responses  of  this  variable  are  in  numerical  form  from  1  to  30,  while  one  category  
reports  “at  least  once.”  This  particular  category  proved  to  be  problematic  for  my  
purposes  as  these  responses  are  necessary  for  analysis,  but  it  would  be  hard  to  
pinpoint  which  numerical  value  they  represent.  I  thus  modified  the  variable  into  
a  categorical  variable  assigning  “none”  for  responses  that  were  identified  as  0,  
“few”  for  responses  between  1  and  10  days  (including  “at  least  once  “  responses  
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since  these  responses  are  expected  to  represent  a  low  frequency),  “some”  for  
responses  between  11  and  20,  and  “many”  for  responses  between  21  and  30.  This  
categorization  is  arbitrary  and  was  decided  solely  to  ensure  there  is  balance  in  
the  division  of  days.  I  modify  these  categories  as  part  of  sensitivity  analysis  in  
Section  5.  The  respondents  who  answered  “at  least  once”  were  not  found  to  have  
significant  differences  as  compares  to  the  rest  of  the  sample  using  a  T-­‐‑test.  
  
I  employ  an  ordered  logit  (with  base  outcome  “none”)  for  the  model.  
Furthermore,  I  generate  another  version  of  the  variable  to  be  a  simple  dummy  
variable  which  takes  the  value  of  “1”  when  respondents  reported  being  hungry  
at  all  in  the  past  month,  and  “0”  for  respondents  who  did  not  report  being  
hungry.  This  variable  is  then  used  in  both  a  logit  model  and  a  Linear  Probability  
Model  (LPM).    
  
4.3  Final  sample    
After  data  manipulation,  the  sample  is  made  up  of  5,900  observations.  I  started  
with  over  150,000  observations  but  once  I  limited  the  sample  to  the  desired  levels  
of  FPL,  by  participation/non-­‐‑participation  in  SNAP  and  by  those  who  answered  
the  question  of  interest,  this  number  shrunk  considerably.    
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The  sample  is  separated  between  treatment  and  comparison  group  with  a  split  
very  close  to  50%.  This  implies  that  the  separation  using  %  of  Federal  Poverty  
Line  created  a  balanced  number  of  observations  in  the  treatment  and  comparison  
groups.  The  average  percentage  of  the  FPL  in  our  sample  is  136%,  which  is  
around  the  cut  off  rate  to  get  into  the  comparison  group.  On  average,  a  
household  has  3  members  and  0-­‐‑1  children.    
  
  
From  Figure  1,  a  bigger  proportion  of  responses  tend  to  report  few  days  of  
hunger,  followed  by  no  days  of  hunger.  “Some”  and  “many”  are  the  bottom  two  
categories.  Moving  from  2008  to  2009,  there  is  a  reduction  in  the  proportion  of  
“few”,  “many”  and  “some”  while  there  is  a  drastic  increase  in  “none.”  This  
supports  my  hypothesis  that  as  there  are  increased  SNAP  payouts  in  2009,  
people  are  reporting  being  hungry  less  frequently,  if  at  all.  
  
The  question  inquiring  about  SNAP  participation  asks  respondents  whether  they  
received  SNAP  during  the  past  year.  Since  the  responses  to  my  independent  
variable  is  concerned  with  the  past  30  days,  I  only  keep  SNAP  participants  that  
had  SNAP  30  days  prior  to  responding  to  the  survey.  Furthermore,  I  assume  that  
treatment  occurs  at  the  start  of  2009  when  in  fact  the  ARRA  came  into  effect  in  
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April  of  2009.  The  data  do  not  provide  enough  rich  monthly  information  to  allow  
for  this  distinction  to  be  accounted  for.    
  
5.  Results  
5.1  Logit  and  Linear  Probability  Model  
The  predicted  average  predicted  probability  of  being  hungry  at  all  for  the  sample  
is  66.8%.  As  seen  in  Table  3,  the  treatment  impacts  are  highly  statistically  
significant.  When  I  add  covariates,  the  coefficients  and  standard  errors  change  
only  minimally.  From  the  LPM  models,  the  increase  in  SNAP  payouts  have  
reduced  the  probability  of  being  hungry  by  9.5-­‐‑9.6  percentage  points,  on  average,  
all  else  constant.  The  logit  models  produce  very  similar  coefficients  and  standard  
errors.    From  the  logit  models,  the  increase  in  SNAP  payouts  cause  a  reduction  in  
the  probability  of  being  hungry  by  9.1-­‐‑9.2  percentage  points,  on  average,  all  else  
constant.  Thus,  the  increase  in  SNAP  payouts  has  reduced  the  probability  of  
being  hungry  by  14%,  on  average  and  holding  all  else  constant.  The  magnitude  
and  direction  of  this  change  indicate  that  the  increases  in  SNAP  payouts  have  
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5.2  Ordered  Logit  
From  Table  4,  all  of  the  treatment  impacts  reach  statistical  significance  and  the  
coefficients  do  not  change  by  much  when  covariates  are  added.  The  percentage  
change  in  the  predicted  probability  of  being  hungry  for  the  “few,”  “some,”  and  
“many”  categories  are  5.2%,  27.3%,  and  35%,  on  average  and  all  else  constant.  
This  shows  a  clear  trend  that  those  who  are  likely  to  report  a  higher  frequency  of  
hunger  are  the  ones  who  experience  a  greater  reduction  in  their  probability  of  
being  hungry.  This  finding  implies  that  increasing  SNAP  payouts  does  a  good  
job  at  decreasing  the  likelihood  of  being  hungry  for  those  who  are  usually  the  
most  affected  by  hunger.  It  is  however  interesting  to  see  that  for  the  lower  strata  
of  “few”  days  of  hunger,  the  reduction  in  the  probability  of  being  hungry  is  only  
5%.  This  implies  that  getting  more  SNAP  benefits  does  not  necessarily  do  a  good  
job  at  reducing  the  hunger  of  those  who  report  fewer  days  of  hunger.  
  
5.3  Different  Categories  for  Variable  of  Interest    
To  test  whether  my  arbitrary  categorization  of  the  variable  of  interest  into  group  
of  10  days  was  adequate,  I  recode  my  variable  of  interest  into  different  ranges.  I  
now  attribute  “few”  to  0-­‐‑5  days,  “some”  to  6-­‐‑15  days  and  many  to  “16-­‐‑30”  days.  
This  will  shrink  the  number  of  observations  in  the  “few”  category  and  increase  
the  number  of  observation  in  the  “many”  category.    
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The  treatment  impacts  once  again  are  mostly  statistically  significant  at  the  5%  
level.  The  “many”  category,  once  more  has  a  greater  percentage  decrease  in  the  
probability  of  hunger.  However,  the  coefficient  on  the  “few”  category  in  this  case  
is  statistically  significant.  This  implies  that  increased  SNAP  payouts  do  not  
necessarily  have  a  measurable  impact  on  those  who  reported  being  hungry  1-­‐‑5  
days.    
  
I  further  try  to  isolate  the  treatment  impact  to  a  range  by  rearranging  the  variable  
of  interest  into  four  categories  based  on  the  number  of  weeks.  The  strata  
employed  are  “1-­‐‑7  days,”  “8-­‐‑14  days,”  “15-­‐‑21  days,”  and  “22-­‐‑30  days.”  The  
results  show  that  the  category  “15-­‐‑21  days”  is  highly  significant.  As  the  lowest  
category  is  expanded,  it  once  again  becomes  statistically  significant  at  the  5%  
level.  The  percentage  decrease  in  the  likelihood  of  being  hungry  “1-­‐‑7  days,”  “8-­‐‑
14  days,”  “15-­‐‑21  days,”  and  “22-­‐‑30  days”  are  1.7%,  18.2%,  24.4%  and  30.8%,  on  
average  and  all  else  constant.  Though  the  lowest  category  is  significant,  the  
magnitude  of  the  decrease  is  the  lowest  compared  to  the  other  categories.  As  we  
go  towards  a  higher  frequency  of  hunger,  there  is  a  bigger  magnitude  in  the  
reduction  of  the  probability  to  be  hungry,  reinforcing  the  previous  claim  that  
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increasing  SNAP  benefits  has  a  bigger  impact  on  those  who  report  more  frequent  
hunger  than  others.  
  
6.  Discussion  and  Conclusion  
The  results  of  my  analyses  suggest  that  increasing  SNAP  payouts  reduces  the  
probability  of  being  hungry  at  various  levels  of  hunger  frequency.  Increasing  
SNAP  payouts  during  the  Great  Recession  has  reduced  the  probability  of  being  
hungry  at  all  by  14%,  on  average,  all  else  constant.  As  for  the  frequency  of  
hunger,  the  treatment  impact  is  strongest  for  those  who  report  being  hungry  
more  frequently  than  others.  Those  who  reported  being  hungry  between  22-­‐‑30  
days  in  the  previous  month  experienced  a  35%  decrease  in  their  probability  of  
being  hungry,  which  is  the  largest  treatment  impact.  Those  who  report  being  
hungry  less  frequently  either  do  not  have  an  impact  on  their  probability  of  being  
hungry  or  see  a  very  small  impact.  I  see  similar  trends  when  I  employ  a  different  
categorizations  of  the  dependent  variable.  
  
These  findings  are  highly  relevant  to  policies  affecting  food  security  and  hunger.  
The  goal  of  increasing  payouts  is  to  help  people  afford  food,  that  is  decrease  the  
likelihood  of  hunger  for  households.  By  my  results,  it  is  clear  that  this  has  been  
accomplished  by  the  increased  payouts.  These  findings  prove  that  in  dire  
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economic  times,  increasing  food  support  does  have  positive  impacts  on  poor  
families.  There  are  limitations  to  my  results  however.  The  external  validity  of  
these  results  is  potentially  reduced  if  generalized  to  non-­‐‑recession  periods.  In  
non-­‐‑recession  periods,  there  might  be  behavioral  differences  in  participants,  
which  are  not  captured  here.  
  
A  potential  future  study  would  be  to  replicate  my  models  but  this  time  using  the  
expiration  of  the  SNAP  payout  reductions  of  2013  as  an  exogenous  shock.  It  
would  then  be  possible  to  analyze  the  reverse  impact:  what  happens  to  hunger  
when  benefits  are  reduced?  This  would  help  identify  whether  decreased  payouts  
affect  hunger  as  we  get  out  of  an  economic  downturn.  Another  idea  for  a  future  
study  would  be  to  identify  the  reason  behind  the  effectiveness  of  SNAP  on  
households  that  report  high  frequency  of  hunger  as  opposed  to  households  that  
report  lower  frequency  of  hunger.  If  the  current  dispensing  of  SNAP  benefits  is  
not  helping  certain  groups  as  much  as  it  intends  to,  it  would  imply  that  there  is  a  
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Tables  and  Figures	  
  
Table  1:  Summary  Statistics.  CPS  –  FSS  sample  
  
      Proportion  
Treatment  Group         54.54%  
Comparison  Group         45.46%  
  
     
  
  
Treatment   Comparison   Total  
Employed   13.19%   37.74%   52.18%  





  White   56.17%   48.10%   70.55%
Black   14.53%   23.28%   9.96%  
Asian   1.43%   0.97%   4.33%  
Hawaiian/Pacific  Islander   0.13%   0.07%   0.37%  
Hispanic   23.84%   22.53%   12.71%  
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Table  2:  Distribution  of  variable  of  interest  into  treatment  and  comparison  group  
sorted  by  year.  Sample  of  CPS-­‐‑FSS.  
   Frequency  with  which  adults  in  the  household  was  
hungry  due  to  the  unavailability  of  food  in  the  past  
month  
  
   None   Few   Some   Many   Total  
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Figure  1:  Distribution  of  responses  to  the  question  “How  many  days  in  the  past  
month  have  you  been  hungry  because  they  could  not  afford  more  food?”.  
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Table  3:  Impact  of  increased  SNAP  payouts  on  the  probability  of  being  hungry  at  
all.  
  
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  
Change  in  probability  of  being  









Covariates   No   Yes   No   Yes  
Fixed  Effects   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Number  of  Observations   5900   5813   5900   5813  
Notes:  Each  column  represents  a  different  regression  model.  Columns  (1)  and  (2)  
are  Linear  Probability  Models  while  (3)  and  (4)  are  Logit  Models,  which  
coefficient  shown  being  average  marginal  effects.  Covariates  are  number  of  
children,  family  size,  employment  status  (0  for  unemployed,  1  for  employed),  %  
of  fpl  and  race  (base:  white,  6  categories).  All  models  include  dummy  variables  
for  state  and  year.  Standard  errors  shown  between  parentheses  are  robust  
standard  errors  for  column  (1)  and  (2),  and  delta  method  standard  errors  for  
column  (3)  and  (4).  Weights  used  are  IPUMS  CPS  household  weights.  Sample  
from  CPS-­‐‑FSS.  
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Table  4:  Impact  of  increased  SNAP  payouts  on  the  probability  of  being  hungry  a  
few,  some  or  many  days,  as  compared  to  none.  
  
Change  in  probability  due  to  treatment:   (1)   (2)  












Covariates   No   Yes  
Fixed  Effects   Yes   Yes  
        
Number  of  Observations   5900   5813  
Notes:  Each  column  represents  a  different  regression  model.  Base  outcome  of  
comparison  is  “none.”  Coefficients  shown  are  average  marginal  effects.  
Covariates  are  number  of  children,  family  size,  employment  status  (0  for  
unemployed,  1  for  employed),  %  of  fpl  and  race  (base:  white,  6  categories).  Both  
models  include  dummy  variables  for  state  and  year.  Standard  errors  shown  
between  parentheses  are  delta  method  standard  errors.  Weights  used  are  IPUMS  
CPS  household  weights.  Sample  from  CPS-­‐‑FSS.  
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Table  5:  Impact  of  increased  SNAP  payouts  on  the  probability  of  being  hungry  a  
few,  some  or  many  days,  as  compared  to  none.  Alternate  categorization  used  for  
sensitivity.  
	  
Change  in  probability  due  to  treatment:   (1)   (2)  












Covariates   No   Yes  
Fixed  Effects   Yes   Yes  
Number  of  observation   5900   5813  
Notes:  Each  column  represents  a  different  regression  model.  Base  outcome  of  
comparison  is  “none.”  Coefficients  shown  are  average  marginal  effects.  
Covariates  are  number  of  children,  family  size,  employment  status  (0  for  
unemployed,  1  for  employed),  %  of  fpl  and  race  (base:  white,  6  categories).  Both  
models  include  dummy  variables  for  state  and  year.Standard  errors  shown  
between  parentheses  are  delta  method  standard  errors.  Weights  used  are  IPUMS  
CPS  household  weights.  Sample  from  CPS-­‐‑FSS.  
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Table  6:  Impact  of  increased  SNAP  payouts  on  the  probability  of  being  hungry  1-­‐‑
7  days,  8-­‐‑14  days,  15-­‐‑21  days,  22-­‐‑30  days  .    
	  
Change  in  probability  due  to  treatment:   (1)   (2)  
















Covariates   No   Yes  
Fixed  Effects   Yes   Yes  
Number  of  observation   5900   5813  
Notes:  Each  column  represents  a  different  regression  model.  Base  outcome  of  
comparison  is  “0  days.”  Coefficients  shown  are  average  marginal  effects.  
Covariates  are  number  of  children,  family  size,  employment  status  (0  for  
unemployed,  1  for  employed),  %  of  fpl  and  race  (base:  white,  6  categories).  Both  
models  include  dummy  variables  for  state  and  year.  Standard  errors  shown  
between  parentheses  are  delta  method  standard  errors.  Weights  used  are  IPUMS  
CPS  household  weights.  Sample  from  CPS-­‐‑FSS.  
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Appendices	  	  
Appendix  A:  Cross-­‐‑tabulation  of  family  income  and  reported  hunger  
Did  adults  in  the  household  experience  hunger  in  the  past  month?  
Family  Income   No   Yes   Total  
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Appendix  B:  Detailed  regression  outputs  for  models  using  LPM    
  
(1)   (2)  
Treatment  Group  Dummy   0.0018   -­‐‑0.16  
  
(0.20)   (0.028)  
Post  ARRA  period  Dummy   -­‐‑0.026   -­‐‑0.022  
  
(0.025)   (0.025)  
Post  ARRA*Treatment  (ATET)   -­‐‑0.096***   -­‐‑0.96***  
  




     
(0.0038)  
%  of  FPL  
  
0.00026  
     
(0.00024)  
Number  of  Children   0.0056  
     
(0.0080)  
Employment  Dummy   -­‐‑0.29*  
     
(0.017)  









     
(0.062)  
Hawaiian/Pacific  Islander   0.21**  





     
(0.021)  
More  than  one  race   0.036  
     
(0.033)  
R-­‐‑Squared   0.031   0.038  
Adjusted  R-­‐‑Squared   0.022   0.027  
F-­‐‑Statistic   3.53   3.67  
Number  of  Observations   5900   5813  
Notes:  Each  column  represents  a  different  regression  model.  Employment  
Dummy  takes  a  value  of  1  if  employed  and  0  if  unemployed.  Both  models  
include  dummy  variables  for  state  and  year.  Standard  errors  shown  between  
parentheses  are  robust  standard  errors.  Sample  from  CPS-­‐‑FSS.  
*  p-­‐‑value<0.1;  **  p-­‐‑value<0.05;  ***  p-­‐‑value<0.05  
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Appendix  C:  Detailed  regression  outputs  for  models  using  Logit  
  
(1)   (2)  
Treatment  Group  Dummy   0.024   0.017  
  
(0.021)   (0.034)  
Post  ARRA  period  Dummy   -­‐‑0.027   -­‐‑0.22  
  
(0.025)   (0.025)  
Post  ARRA*Treatment  (ATET)   -­‐‑0.092***   -­‐‑0.91***  
  




     
(0.0038)  
%  of  FPL  
  
0.00026  
     
(0.00024)  
Number  of  Children  
  
0.058  





     
(0.018)  



















     
(0.020)  
More  than  one  race  
  
0.035  
     
(0.032)  
Pseudo  R-­‐‑Squared   0.0247   0.0301  
Wald  Chi-­‐‑Squared   167.81   198.44  
Number  of  Observations   5900   5813  
Notes:  Each  column  represents  a  different  regression  model.  Coefficients  shown  
are  average  marginal  effects.  Employment  Dummy  takes  a  value  of  1  if  
employed  and  0  if  unemployed.  Both  models  include  dummy  variables  for  state  
and  year.  Standard  errors  shown  between  parentheses  are  Delta  Method  
Standard  Errors.  Sample  from  CPS-­‐‑FSS.  
  
*  p-­‐‑value<0.1;  **  p-­‐‑value<0.05;  ***  p-­‐‑value<0.01  
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(1) (2) (3) 
Treatment Group 
Dummy -0.000094 0.00011 -0.00011 
 
(0.0052) (0.0063) (0.0061) 
    Post ARRA period 
Dummy -0.043 0.0052 -0.050 
 
(0.0067) (0.0080) (0.0078) 
    Post 
ARRA*Treatment 
(ATET) -0.025*** -0.031*** -0.030*** 
 
(0.0076) (0.0090) (0.030) 
    Pseudo R-Squared 0.014 
 Wald Chi-Squared 197.03 
 Number of Observations 5900 
 Notes:  Each  column  represents  a  different  regression  model.  Column  (1)  is  for  
“few”  category,  (2)  is  for  “some”  category  and  (3)  is  for  “many”  category.  Base  
outcome  of  comparison  is  “none.”  Coefficients  shown  are  average  marginal  
effects.  Employment  Dummy  takes  a  value  of  1  if  employed  and  0  if  
unemployed.  Model  includes  dummy  variables  for  state  and  year.  Standard  
errors  shown  between  parentheses  are  Delta  Method  standard  errors.  Sample  
from  CPS-­‐‑FSS.  
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Appendix  E:  Detailed  regression  outputs  for  Ordered  Logit  with  covariates.  
  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Treatment Group Dummy -0.019 -0.0023 -0.0022 
 
(0.0088) (0.011) (0.010) 
Post ARRA period Dummy -0.027 0.0033 -0.0032 
 
(0.0067) (0.0081) (0.0078) 
Post ARRA*Treatment (ATET) -0.025*** -0.030*** 0.029*** 
 
(0.0076) (0.0090) (0.0086) 






(0.00099) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
% of FPL 0.000013 -0.000016 -0.000015 
 
(0.000063) (0.00077) (0.000074) 
Number of Children 0.0026 0.0032 0.0031 
 
(0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0024) 
Employment Dummy -0.0079* -0.096* -0.0092 
 
(0.0047) (0.056) (0.0054) 
Race (Base: White) 
  Black -0.0057 -0.0061 -0.0057 
 
(0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0060) 
Asian -0.12*** -0.057*** -0.047 
 
(0.040) (0.012) (0.0088) 
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander -0.024 0.87 0.12 
 
(0.079) (0.057) (0.12) 
Hispanic 0.0061 0.085 0.0083 
 
(0.047) (0.069) (0.0068) 
More than one race 0.0040 0.0053 0.0051 
 
(0.0074) (0.011) (0.010) 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.017 
 Wald Chi-Squared 222.10 
 Number of Observations 5813 
 Notes:  Each  column  represents  a  different  regression  model.  Column  (1)  is  for  
“few”  category,  (2)  is  for  “some”  category  and  (3)  is  for  “many”  category.  Base  
outcome  of  comparison  is  “none.”  Coefficients  shown  are  average  marginal  
effects.  Employment  Dummy  takes  a  value  of  1  if  employed  and  0  if  
unemployed.  Model  includes  dummy  variables  for  state  and  year.  Standard  
errors  shown  between  parentheses  are  Delta  Method  standard  errors.  Sample  
from  CPS-­‐‑FSS.  
  
*  p-­‐‑value<0.1;  **  p-­‐‑value<0.05;  ***  p-­‐‑value<0.01  
